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HONORABLE KENNETH R. RIGTRUP

JURISDICTION
Ms.

Lamb

incorporates

by

reference

the

statement

of

jurisdiction set forth in Appellant's Brief.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Ms. Lamb incorporates by reference the issues presented for
review as set forth in Appellant's Brief.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Ms. Lamb incorporates by reference her statement of relief
sought on appeal as set forth in Appellant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ms. Lamb incorporates by reference her statement of the case
as set forth in Appellant's Brief.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ms. Lamb incorporates by reference her statement of facts set
forth in Appellant's Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
Judge Rigtrup committed reversible error in granting defendant
Curtis Industries, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment.

It was

contrary to the rule of res ipsa loquitur for Judge Rigtrup to
grant that motion. It is necessary and appropriate for Ms. Lamb to
be granted a new trial against both defendants.
II.
The cases from other jurisdictions that impose upon operators
of amusement rides a standard of care tantamount to the common
carrier standard of care are the better reasoned cases and those
embodying better public policy. There is no meaningful distinction
between carriers and operators of amusement rides to justify
differing standards of care.

This Court should adopt the higher

standard of care and, accordingly, order a new trial against B & B.
III.
It was improper and constituted reversible error for the
District Court to permit B & B's expert to opine that the accident
occurred due to a defective or "flawed" bolt.
IV.
B & B's discussion of Ms. Lamb's damages is inappropriate and
irrelevant for purposes of this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A SIMULTANEOUS TRIAL AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS
IS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE•
Ms. Lamb was riding as a paying passenger on B St B's roller
coaster, with her son, when two of the coaster's cars separated.
The cars separated for a reason (the bolt broke or became loose
from

its

restraining

device

and

fell

off).

Under

the

circumstances, Ms. Lamb was not in a position to explain what
happened.
The accident occurred (1) because Curtis sold a defective bolt
to B & B and/or (2) because B & B failed to take appropriate care
to maintain and/or inspect the bolt.

In short, the only two

parties who could have been responsible for this accident were
Curtis, the manufacturer and seller to B & B of the bolt that was
used to attach the cars to one another, and B & B, the owner and
operator of the ride. Ms. Lamb did nothing wrong.
that point before trial.

B & B conceded

Because Judge Rigtrup granted Curtis's

motion for summary judgment, B & B was able to point, and did point
(over Ms. Lamb's strenuous pre-trial and trial objections), to an
"empty chair" at trial.
Contrary to the arguments made in the Curtis Brief, the res
ipsa loquitur cases cited in Appellant's Brief clearly show that it
was improper for Judge Rigtrup to grant the Curtis motion for
summary judgment, the Curtis Brief's urging this Court to adopt a
minimalist view of the doctrine notwithstanding.

Judge Rigtrup's

ruling was contrary to the purpose and the spirit of the rule of
3

res ipsa loquitur. Regardless of the fact that Ms. Lamb offered no
"Rule 56(f) affidavit" (Curtis Brief at 12), and regardless of the
fact that Ms. Lamb's expert was of the view that B & B's negligence
was the sole cause of the accident, the state of the record before
Judge Rigtrup at the summary judgment state clearly mandated the
denial of the Curtis motion.
If this Court determines to reverse the summary judgment
against Curtis and permit Ms. Lamb to have her trial against Curtis
without B & B, the same dilemma will arise.

Curtis will then have

its turn to point to an "empty chair" at whose feet blame can be
laid.
B & B argues that the jury has already considered Ms. Lamb's
theories of negligence against it.

However, due to the District

Court's reversible errors (a) in granting Curtis's motion for
summary judgment; (b) in ruling that B & B's standard of care was
simple negligence; and (c) in permitting B & B's Dr. Blotter to
testify that the most likely explanation for the subject accident
was a flawed or defective bolt, and due to B & B's taking advantage
of those rulings, it is appropriate that this case be retried, with
both B & B and Curtis participating as defendants.
Contrary to B & B's suggestion (B & B's Brief at 26) , Ms. Lamb
was in no sense constrained to seek interlocutory review of Judge
Rigtrup's granting of the Curtis summary judgment motion.

This

Court very seldom grants such review and, Ms. Lamb submits, would
not likely have granted it in this case.

Quite apart from the

matter of the general ill-advisedness of reviewing cases piecemeal,
4

this Court would likely have determined, if it had considered such
a putative petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal, that
Ms. Lamb was likely to have prevailed at trial against B & B alone
(especially if B & B was not allowed to point to the empty chair),
would not likely have granted leave to file, and would, thus, not
have reached the merits of the granting of the Curtis motion for
summary judgment.
POINT II
THE STANDARD OF CARE IMPOSED UPON B & B SHOULD BE
A COMMON CARRIER'S STANDARD OF CARE.
B & B argues that the District Court did not err in refusing
to instruct the jury that the appropriate standard of care imposed
upon B & B is tantamount to the common carrier standard of care.
In its Brief, B & B cites various old authorities and a few cases
(including one decided in 1923) for the proposition that ordinary
care is the appropriate standard of care for operators of amusement
rides.

Ms. Lamb acknowledges that there is a clear split of

authority on this issue but submits that the cases imposing a
common carrier standard of care on the operators of amusement rides
are better reasoned and embody better public policy.
B & B argues that the distinction between a traditionally
recognized common carrier and an amusement ride operator justifies
differing standards of care. The distinction relied on by B & B is
that a common carrier transports a person from one place to
another, for purposes of "business or personal necessity" (B & B's
Brief at 31) whereas an amusement ride operator conveys its
passengers to a point at or near the point where they originally
5

boarded; that carriage of amusement ride passengers is incidental;
and

that

the

purpose

of

an

amusement

ride

is

to

provide

entertainment and thrills.1
The distinction posited by B & B does not make sense.

The

important factor in determining the level of care that should be
imposed upon a traditional carrier or on an amusement ride operator
is that passengers surrender themselves, for a fee, to the care and
custody of the carrier or the operator of the amusement ride.
Passengers

give up, to strangers who are

in the

conveyance

business, their freedom of movement and action and their ability to
cause or prevent accidents. See, Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's Inc.. 396
P.2d 933, 939 (Colo. 1964).

This is true whether the operator of

the conveyance is a traditional carrier or an amusement company.
B & B's argument that people utilize carriers for necessary
transportation, whereas riders of amusement devices do not ride of
necessity, is not persuasive.
Brief,

there

are

As set forth in Ms. Lamb's initial

innumerable

instances

of

people's

using

traditionally recognized common carriers solely for purposes of
entertainment and fun and not for purposes of "business or personal
necessity." A vacationer, for example, who uses an airline to get
to his or her vacation spot can expect and is unquestionably
entitled to the same high standard of care as is a business person
who is flying to the location of a critical meeting.

*For what it's worth, and lest there be any misunderstanding,
Ms. Lamb was certainly not "seeking thrills" in connection with her
ride of the B & B coaster that came apart. She was taking care of
the business of accompanying her three year old son on the ride.
6

The closer one looks at B & B's posited distinction between a
traditional carrier and the operator of an amusement ride, the less
sense it makes. For example, at the Lagoon amusement park, located
in Davis County, Utah, there is a ride known as the "Sky Ride,"
which

is

essentially

a

horizontally-running,

skilift-like

conveyance extending from the north end to the south end of the
park.

Because that ride transports the patron from point A to

point B, rather than returning the patron to the point where the
ride begins, and because that ride is in fact used by some patrons
for transportation from one end of Lagoon to the other, the entity
that operates Lagoon could conceivably, with respect to that ride,
under B & B's definition, be subjected to a common carrier's
standard of care.

Under B & B's posited distinction, that same

entity would, with respect to the other rides in that same park
(even though payment of one fee entitles the person to ride all
rides, including the "Sky Ride"), be held only to an "ordinary"
standard of care.

What sense does that make?

Similarly, under B

& B's analysis, a Utah Transit Authority patron who, for whatever
reason, "gets his kicks" by riding a bus around town for hours, and
alights from the bus, according to plan, only when it returns to
the stop at which he climbed aboard should be allowed to hold the
UTA only to an "ordinary" standard of care, even though UTA clearly
owes

its

more

"normal,"

destination-seeking

passengers

the

highest, common carrier, standard of care.
In the modern world, there should be no distinction between
the standard of care imposed upon traditional carriers and that
7

imposed upon the operators of amusement rides. As stated in Lewis
v. Buckskin Joe's Inc., 396 P.2d at 939, it is not important
whether

a

defendant

occupationally

engaged

is

serving

in

as

a

common

the provision

of

carrier

amusement

or

is

rides.

Whether the conveyance in question is a bus, a train, an airplane,
or an amusement ride, the passengers of all surrender themselves,
for a fee, to the inspection, maintenance, and operation expertise
and care of entities who are engaged in business and who hold
themselves out, expressly or by implication, as being worthy of the
public trust.

This Court should recognize that fact.

B & B claims that Judge Rigtrup's failure to instruct the jury
that the appropriate standard of care imposed upon B & B is that of
a common carrier was, if error, not reversible error.

However,

based on the language of Jury Instruction Forms for Utah (JIFU)
31.6, Ms. Lamb submits that failure to provide a common carrier
instruction was reversible error.

That form instruction, derived

from Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co. , 147 P. 2d 875 (Utah
1944), and Johnson v. Lewis, 240 P.2d 498 (Utah 1952), provides, in
pertinent part:
As a common carrier the defendant . . . was required by
law to use the highest degree of care for the safe
carriage of plaintiff, to provide everything reasonably
necessary for that purpose and exercise a reasonable
degree of skill.
(Emphasis added.)
The language of that instruction

("to

provide everything

reasonably necessary for that purpose") would be expected to have
focused the jury's attention upon the component parts of a roller
8

coaster, including the bolt that either (1) broke or (2) fell out
after its retaining nut or cotter pin came off.

Ms. Lamb submits

that that instruction is, especially when read against the dynamics
of

this

case,

substantially

different

from

regarding ordinary care that was actually given.

the

instruction

The jury would

reasonably have been expected to have found B & B negligent if it
had been instructed regarding this higher duty of care.

For

properly functioning and non-defective bolts were, beyond cavil,
items that were "reasonably necessary for [the purpose] of the safe
carriage" of Ms. Lamb.
Finally, the fact that B & B obtained and used, in its
argument to Judge Rigtrup regarding the standard-of-care issue, an
affidavit

of a state official

indicating that Utah does not

regulate the operators of amusement rides as common carriers is
irrelevant.

Such an affidavit has no bearing on the question of

whether Judge Rigtrup could not or this Court cannot impose the
standard of the highest degree of care upon the operators of
amusement rides.
POINT III
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO PERMIT B & B'S EXPERT TO TESTIFY THAT
THE BOLT WAS "FLAWED."
Ms. Lamb objected, at a side-bar conference (Tr. at 417) to
the

then-obviously-upcoming

testimony

of

B

&

B's

expert

(Dr. Blotter) regarding his theory that the most likely cause of
the roller coaster's failure was a defective or "flawed" bolt.
That conference was conducted at a point in the proceedings where
9

its context and content is very clear.

It is indisputable that

Ms. Lamb's undersigned counsel did not object on the record (which
he freely concedes he should have done but which he erroneously
omitted to do at the time).

Ms. Lamb contends, however, that it

would be disingenuous for B & B's counsel (who was a party to that
side-bar conference) to deny, with respect to such a potentially
critical issue, that Ms. Lamb's counsel then and there in fact
objected on grounds of surprise and non-response to Interrogatories, to the then-pending question and to the entire subject line
of questioning, or that Judge Rigtrup then and there in fact
overruled that objection to Dr. Blotter's testimony.
something that should be addressed at oral argument.

This is
If B & B's

counsel there acknowledges the accuracy of the foregoing recitation
of what occurred during that conference, it would be an absurd
promotion of form over substance for this Court to treat that
objection and ruling as though they had not occurred.
In any event (and as pointed out in paragraphs 16-18 of the
Statement of Facts (pp. 15-17) appearing in Appellant's Brief),
Ms. Lamb had, prior to trial, contended that B & B should not be
allowed to seek to elicit the evidence it in fact successfully
elicited from Dr. Blotter.

She had already made whatever record

she had to make, and Judge Rigtrup, in allowing Dr. Blotter to
testify as he did, in essence denied Ms. Lamb's Motion in Limine.
Furthermore, as also pointed out in that part of Appellant's Brief
(top of p. 16), B & B in essence acknowledged, just prior to trial,
that it would not seek to elicit the subject "flawed bolt" opinion
10

testimony of Dr. Blotter.
It was not only error for Judge Rigtrup to allow Dr. Blotter
to testify as he did.

It was, as Ms. Lamb sought to explain in

Appellant's Brief (at 38-41),2 and regardless of B & B's efforts to
convince this Court otherwise, prejudicial, reversible error. But
for Dr. Blotter's testimony, no reasonable jury would have found,
as 6 of the 8 jurors did, that B & B was not negligent.

And,

contrary to B & B's contention, Ms. Lamb has, indeed, marshalled
the evidence (Appellant's Brief at 38-41).
B & B claims that it was not unfair surprise for Dr. Blotter
to be allowed to testify as he did. However, this is not the case.
B & B did not supplement its answers to Ms. Lamb's interrogatories
which asked what it was to which B & B's expert(s) would testify at
trial.

Had Ms. Lamb known that Dr. Blotter would testify that in

his opinion the most likely cause of the accident was a defective
or "flawed" bolt, she would have been reasonably expected to have
taken

appropriate

examination

of

steps

to

Dr. Blotter

prepare
and/or

a more

rebuttal

effective
testimony

crossfrom a

2

Ms. Lamb's undersigned counsel has discovered, in the course
of his preparation of this Reply Brief, an error that somehow
occurred in the final preparation of those pages of Appellant's
Brief. Although the context is nonetheless, it is hoped, clear,
there is an important transitional clause that should appear
between the last sentence on page 38 and the paragraph numbered
"1." at the top of page 39. The transitional language that was
inadvertently omitted was the following:
Apart from Dr. Blotter's testimony, the only substantial
evidence of B & B's supposed non-negligence was:
Ms. Lamb's counsel expresses his regret for and apologizes for any
inconvenience this omission and concomitant lack of clarity may
have caused the Court or opposing counsel.
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mechanical engineer of her choosing.
It is inaccurate and misleading for B & B to contend that
Ms. Lamb,

in

any

meaningful

sense,

"opened

the

door"

to

Dr. Blotter's testimony, by reason of how her own expert, David
Stephens, testified, or otherwise. The fact of the matter is that
B & B knew, or should have known, by virtue of the testimony given
in his deposition, that Mr. Stephens might, in passing, address and
discuss at trial, as he did, the matter of whether the bolt may
have been defective and whether such a defect could have caused the
accident.

A copy of that portion (p. 36, lines 14-24) of the

transcript of the deposition of Mr. Stephens in which the matter is
discussed is attached hereto as the Appendix.

Particularly in

light of this matter having been aired, however briefly, in the
deposition of Mr. Stephens, it was incumbent on B & B not only to
be

forthright

and

thorough

in

its

response

to

Ms. Lamb's

interrogatories but also to be prepared to meet such an opinion if
it should emerge, as it did, in Mr. Stephens's trial testimony. A
review of the trial testimony of Dr. Blotter (Tr. at 380-471; see,
especially, pp. 417-426) makes it quite clear that Dr. Blotter was
thoroughly prepared to testify as he did regarding the supposed
"flaw" in the bolt. Ms. Lamb submits that it is not reasonable to
assume that he scampered to do his testing and analysis and come to
his stated

opinions within the less-than-48-hour

period that

separated the testimony of Mr. Stephens from his own.

Try as it

might, B & B cannot successfully argue either that it was surprised
by the testimony of Mr. Stephens or that Dr. Blotter was not
12

prepared, before trial, to testify as he did.
inform Ms. Lamb,

in timely

B & B's failure to

fashion, of Dr. Blotters

planned

testimony violated both the letter and the spirit of the rules
governing

discovery

and worked

substantial harm

to Ms. Lamb.

Contrary to B & B's contention (B & B's Brief at 40), Dr. Blotters
testimony was not in the nature of "rebuttal" testimony. B & B was
a defendant, and it had a duty to prepare to meet Ms. Lamb's case
in chief and to inform her of the expert testimony it would be
offering in defense.
Ms. Lamb acknowledges that Dr. Blotter could fairly have
testified,

based

on the pre-trial proceedings, that,

in his

opinion, B & B acted appropriately if it, in fact, followed its own
prescribed maintenance schedule.

But to allow Dr. Blotter to

testify that the most likely cause of the roller coaster was a
"flawed" bolt, when Curtis was no longer a party to this suit and
when Ms. Lamb had, despite her diligent use of the interrogatory
procedure, no foreknowledge of what Dr. Blotter would say, was
improper.

It substantially and unfairly prejudiced Ms. Lamb.
POINT IV
B & B'S DISCUSSION OF THE SUPPOSEDLY
"INCREDIBLE" NATURE OF MS. LAMB'S
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IS INAPPROPRIATE,
IRRELEVANT, AND INACCURATE.

B & B argues that an alleged lack of credibility on the part
of Ms. Lamb and the "incredible" nature of her claims was an
important factor in the jury's determination that B & B was not
negligent.

It is clearly inappropriate for B & B to ask the Court

to join it in such a speculative endeavor.
13

Indeed, B & B's effort

in making such an argument may be read as an indication of its own
lack of belief in the strength of the other arguments advanced in
its Brief.
A Special Verdict form was submitted to the jury.

Six of the

eight jurors answered "no" to the question of whether B & B was
negligent.

Because the jury answered "no" to this question, none

of the subsequent questions (regarding proximate cause and damages)
was considered. This appeal relates to Ms. Lamb's contentions that
the trial court committed reversible error, by granting Curtis's
motion for summary judgment; by incorrectly instructing the jury
regarding the standard of care governing B & B's conduct; and by
permitting B & B's expert to testify as he did regarding the bolt.
It does not deal with Ms. Lamb's claims for damages.

In the event

that the Court is interested, for any reason, in reviewing such
evidence as is contained in the record on appeal regarding Ms.
Lamb's credibility and damages, such evidence is contained not only
in the one-sided recitation of portions of the transcript cited by
B & B.

It is also contained in the entirety of Ms. Lamb's

testimony (Tr. at 243-293; 328-380) and in Trial Exhibits 9, 10,
17, 19, 20, and 21 (consisting of medical and related reports
(Exhibits 9, 17, 20, and 21) and summaries (Exhibits 10 and 19) of
her special damages).

Several of Ms. Lamb's health care providers

were called by her, at trial, and testified concerning the nature,
causation, severity, and permanency of her injuries.

She did not

request transcripts of the testimony of those witnesses because she
did not think her damages would be a focus of this appeal.
14

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing as well as on the discussion and
analysis appearing in Appellant's Brief, Ms. Lamb urges the Court
to correct the errors made at the trial court level, to permit her
to

have

her

true

day

in

court

against

both

defendants,

simultaneously, and to let the jury, in that trial, sort out the
issues

of

strict

liability,

negligence

(on a

common-carrier

standard with respect to B & B) , causation, and damages.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/?

day of March 1992.

WINDER A HASLAM, P.C.

By.
Peter C. Collins
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

/7

day of March 1992, I caused four

true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF to
be mailed with postage pre-paid to each of the following:
Robert H. Henderson, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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APPENDIX

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TAMMY HERRING, AN INDIVIDUAL
AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR
ANTHONY HERRING,
PLAINTIFFS,

VS.

CIVIL NO.

C 86-7252

B & B AMUSEMENTS CORP., AND
CURTIS INDUSTRIES, INC., AN
OHIO CORPORATION,

DEPOSITION OF:
DAVID CLARK STEPHENS

DEFENDANTS,
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 15TH DAY OF MARCH, 19'90,
THE DEPOSITION OF DAVID CLARK STEPHENS, PRODUCED AS A WITNESS
HEREIN AT THE INSTANCE OF THE DEFENDANT B S B AMUSEMENTS CORP.,
HEREIN, IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION NOW PENDING IN THE ABOVENAMED COURT, WAS TAKEN BEFORE SUSAN K. HELLBERG, A CERTIFIED
SHORTHAND REPORTER AND NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF
UTAH, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9:10 A.M. OF SAID DAY AT
THE OFFICES OF HANSON, EPPERSON S SMITH, ATTORNEYS AT LAW,
#*f TRIAD CENTER, SUITE 500, SALT LAKE CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.
THAT SAID DEPOSITION WAS TAKEN PURSUANT TO NOTICE.

Repertlrf Service, Ire.
322 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Phone (801) 531-0256

Susan K. Hellberg, C.S.R., R.P.R.

1

ONLY TWO OPTIONS THAT YOU CAN ENVISION THAT WOULD HAVE CAUSED

2

THIS BOLT TO BREAK?

3

A

THE THIRD OPTION IS THAT THE BOLT DID NOT BREAK,

4

AND THE NUT FELL OFF AND THE BOLT FELL OUT OF ITS OWN WEIGHT,

5

AND WHATEVER THEY MAY HAVE FOUND WAS NOT RELATED TO THE

6

ACCIDENT.

7

Q

DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE PORTION

8

OF THE BOLT THAT WAS FOUND BY THE EMPLOYEES OF B & B

9

AMUSEMENT UNDER THE CHILDREN'S ROLLER COASTER AT THE TIME OF

10

THIS ACCIDENT WAS NOT THE BOLT THAT HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THIS

11

COUPLING?

12 I
13
14
15

A

I HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT.

I MERELY GAVE

YOU AN OPTION.
Q

ISN'T ANOTHER OPTION THE FACT THAT THERE MAY HAVE

BEEN SOME DEFECT IN THE BOLT?

16

A

I GUESS THAT'S AN OPTION, YES.

17

Q

SO THERE MAY BE OTHER OPTIONS, IT'S JUST THOSE ARE

18
19
20

THE ONLY ONES THAT YOU COULD COME UP WITH?
A

I FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT A

DEFECTIVE BOLT, EVEN DEFECTIVE, WOULD CAUSE THIS ACCIDENT.

21

Q

WHY IS THAT?

22

A

BECAUSE THE AMOUNT OF STRESS APPLIED IN THIS

23

CIRCUMSTANCE COMPARED TO THE TENSILE STRENGTH OF ANY GRADE

24

BOLT IS VERY LOW.

25 I

Q

HAVE YOU DONE ANY CALCULATIONS TO DETERMINE WHAT

